TS 220, §2; TS 227, §1c

TS 220

2. Denke nun an diese Verwendung der Sprache: — Ich schicke jemand einkaufen. Ich gebe ihm einen Zettel, auf diesem stehen die Zeichen: 'fünf rote Äpfel'. Er trägt den Zettel zum Kaufmann; der öffnet die Lade, auf welcher das Zeichen 'Äpfel' steht; dann sucht er in einer Tabelle das Wort 'rot' auf und findet ihm gegenüber ein färbiges Täfelchen; nun sagt er die Reihe der Grundzahlwörter — ich nehme an, er weiß sie auswendig — bis zum Worte 'fünf' und bei jedem Zahlwort nimmt er einen Apfel aus der Lade, der die Farbe des Täfelchens hat. — So, und ähnlich, operiert man mit Worten. — 'Wie weiß er aber, wo und wie er das Wort "rot" nachschlagen soll und was er mit dem Wort "fünf" anzufangen hat?' — Nun, ich nehme eben an, er handelt, wie ich es beschrieben habe. Die Erklärungen haben irgendwo ein Ende. — Was ist aber die Bedeutung des Wortes 'fünf'? — Von einer solchen war hier gar nicht die Rede; nur davon, wie das Wort ‘fünf’ gebraucht wird.

The third paragraph of §1 of TS 227 is identical with this except that 'färbiges Täfelchen' and 'Täfelchens' have been replaced with 'Farbmuster' and 'Musters,' respectively, and 'eben' in 'Nun, ich nehme eben an. . . .' has been deleted. Below, my translation appears in green, Rhees's in orange (with Wittgenstein's corrections in black), and Anscombe's in blue.

2. Think now of this use of language: I send someone shopping. I give him a slip of paper, on this appear the signs: 'five red Apples'. He takes the slip to the grocer; who opens the drawer on which the sign 'Appel' appears; then he looks up the word 'red' in a table and finds a colored patch opposite it; now he says the series of cardinal number-words — I assume he knows them by heart — up to the word 'five' and with every number-word he takes an apple that has the color of the patch from the drawer. — In this and similar ways, one operates with words. 'But how did he know where and how he should look up the word "red" and what he has to do with the word "five"?' — Well, I just assume he behaves as I have described. Explanations have an end somewhere. — But what is the meaning of the word 'five'? The discussion here was not about such an entity; only about how the word 'five' is used.

2. Consider now this application of language: I send someone shopping. I give him a slip of paper, on which are the marks I have written the signs: 'five red apples'. He takes it to the grocer; the grocer opens the box drawer that has the mark sign 'apples' on it; then he looks up the word 'red' in a table, and finds opposite it a coloured square; he now speaks says out loud the series of cardinal numbers cardinals — I assume he knows them by heart — up to the word 'five' and with each numeral he takes an apple from the box that has the colour of the square he takes an apple that has the colour of the square from the drawer. — This is how one works In this and in similar ways one operates with words. — 'But How does he know where and how he is to look up the word "red" and what he has to do with the word "five"?’ — Well, I am assuming that he acts, as I have described. Explanations come to an end somewhere. — But what's the meaning of the word 'five'? — There was no question of such an entity 'meaning' here; only of the way in which 'five' is used. Nothing of that sort was being discussed, only the way in which 'five' is used.

Now think of the following use of language: I send someone shopping. I give him a slip marked 'five red apples'. He takes the slip to the shopkeeper, who opens the drawer marked 'apples'; then he looks up the word 'red' in a table and finds a colour sample opposite it; then he says the series of cardinal numbers — I assume that he knows them by heart — up to the word 'five' and for each number he takes an apple of the same colour as the sample out of the drawer. — It is in this and similar ways that one operates with words. — 'But how does he know where and how he is to look up the word "red" and what he is to do with the word "five"?' — Well, I assume that he acts as I have described. Explanations come to an end somewhere. — But what is the meaning of the word 'five'? — No such thing was in question here, only how the word 'five' is used.

Notes

(1) Concerning 'Täfelchen,' the dictionary entry reads "[small] slab; [small] bar." In his translation of "Notebook I" (dictated by Wittgenstein to Waismann), Gordon Baker translates 'Täfelchen' as 'patch.'

(2) Concerning 'was er mit dem Wort "fünf" anzufangen hat,' the verb gave me some trouble. Fortunately, the fourth entry under 'haben' reads "mit 'zu' u. Inf. [...] etw. zu tun/erledigen ~: have sth. to do."

Comments

(1) The change of 'Täfelchens' to 'Musters' does not signal a new interest in samples. That interest is already fully developed in The Big Typescript (TS 213).

(2) Wittgenstein's correction of Rhees's translation of the last line is important. Rhees's sentence could be misconstrued as stating that the discussion has nothing to do with the meaning of the word 'five.' Anscombe's translation is not much better. In English 'no such thing' is similar to 'nothing' in that 'thing' does not (have to) indicate some thing. Wittgenstein's use of 'entity' is much stronger. As Hacker comments, Wittgenstein's correction "makes it clear what concept of meaning is under attack."

TS 220, §1; TS 227, §1a-b

TS 220

1. In diesen Worten erhalten wir — so scheint es mir — ein bestimmtes Bild von dem Wesen der menschlichen Sprache. Nämlich dieses: Die Wörter der Sprache benennen Gegenstände — Sätze sind Verbindungen von solchen Benennungen.

In diesem Bild von der Sprache finden wir die Wurzeln der Idee: Jedes Wort hat eine Bedeutung. Diese Bedeutung ist dem Wort zugeordnet. Sie ist der Gegenstand, für welchen das Wort steht.

Von einem Unterschied der Wortarten spricht Augustinus nicht. Wer das Lernen der Sprache so beschreibt, denkt — so möchte ich glauben — zunächst an Hauptwörter, wie "Tisch", "Stuhl", "Brot" und die Namen von Personen; erst in zweiter Linie an die Namen gewisser Tätigkeiten und Eigenschaften, und an die übrigen Wortarten als an etwas, was sich finden wird.

The first two paragraphs of §1 of TS 227 are identical with this except that the last 'an' has been deleted. Below, my translation appears in green, Rhees's in orange (with Wittgenstein's corrections in black), and Anscombe's in blue.

1. In these words we are given — it seems to me — a particular picture of the essence of human language. Namely this: the words of language name objects — sentences are combinations of such namings.

In this picture of language we find the roots of the idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is related to the word. It is the object for which the word stands.

Augustine does not speak of a difference of the kinds of word. Anyone who describes the learning of language this way, thinks — I should like to believe — first about nouns, like "table", "chair", "bread" and the names of people; only second in line about the names of certain activities and properties, and about the remaining kinds of word as something that will work out all right.

1. In these words we have get — it seems to me — a definite picture of the nature of human language. Namely this: the words of the language designate name objects — sentences are combinations of such designations names.

In this picture of human language we find the root of the idea: every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated to the word. It is the object which the word stands for.

Augustine however does not speak of a distinction between parts of speech. Whoever If one describes the learning of language in this way, one thinks — I should imagine — primarily of substantives, like "table", "chair", "bread" and the names of persons; and of the other parts of speech as something that will work come out all right eventually.

1. These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the individual words in language name objects — sentences are combinations of such names. — In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.

Augustine does not speak of there being any difference between kinds of word. If you describe the learning of language in this way you are, I believe, thinking primarily of nouns like "table", "chair", "bread", and of people's names, and only secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties; and of the remaining kinds of word as something that will take care of itself.

Notes

(1) I translated "der Wortarten" as "of kinds of word." This doesn't sound right, but I couldn't find a justification in the dictionary for translating "der" as "between." Or is it that "Unterscheid" can mean "difference between"? If it can, that's not in the dictionary either.

(2) "in zweiter Linie" must be an idiom.

Comments

(1) Concerning "Wortarten," Hacker comments that "W. preferred 'parts of speech.'" As evidence for this, Hacker cites Rhees's translation. However, "parts of speech" is Rhees's, not Wittgenstein's (i.e., it is not one of Wittgenstein's corrections). Is the fact that Wittgenstein didn't correct it evidence that he preferred it over, e.g., "kinds of word"? Cf. Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge, 1930-1932, p. 3: "Substantives and other parts of speech are only essential in our language. Such linguistic classifications are very misleading, as can be seen by substituting words for each other in propositions of the same linguistic form. Substitution is only possible when the words are of the same kind." Here Wittgenstein speaks of parts of speech and kinds of word.

(2) It is interesting that Rhees doesn't translate "erst in zweiter Linie an die Namen gewisser Tätigkeiten und Eigenschaften." There's no indication in TS 220 that the clause was a hand-written addition.

TS 220 & TS 227

The first version of Wittgenstein's Philosophische Untersuchungen (corresponding roughly to §§1-189 of the published version) is a manuscript (MS 142) written in the last months of 1936 and the first half of 1937. TS 220 is a typescript of MS 142 that was produced sometime in the second half of 1937 (see Hacker). The published version of the Untersuchungen (TS 227) was produced eight years later in 1945.

With this blog I plan to (1) translate both TS 220 and TS 227, (2) compare my translations with those of Rhees (MS 226; corrected by Wittgenstein) and Anscombe, respectively, and (3) comment on any differences between the typescripts. My German is a work in progress; criticism is welcome.